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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

FRANK EDWARD PHARRIS,
:

Case No. 890549-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant relies on his opening brief, and refers this
Court to that brief for the statements of jurisdiction, issues,
the case, and the facts.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court's jurisprudence over post-Gibbons guilty
pleas is consistent: it calls for strict compliance with Rule 11
in the entry of the plea.

Because this is a post-Gibbons guilty

plea and the trial court did not comply with the plain
requirements of Rule 11, the entry of the plea was improper.
This issue may be raised for the first time on appeal.
In twice emphasizing Appellant's criminal record, which
was already in the court file, the prosecutor effectively argued
against Appellant's motion for diminished sentencing.

This issue

focuses on a broken contract between the prosecutor and
Appellant, rather than the trial court's sentencing decision.
Because the prosecutor failed to honor his contractual duty,
Appellant is entitled to reversal.
the first time on appeal.
1

This issue may be raised for

I.
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE
TO COMPLY WITH THE TERMS OF RULE 11
RENDERS THE ENTRY OF APPELLANT'S GUILTY PLEA
INVALID.
Since the Gibbons decision was written, this Court has
consistently maintained the rule that in accepting guilty pleas,
1
trial courts must comply strictly with the Rule 11.
As
explained by the Gibbons court, the purposes of the strict
compliance rule are
to assist trial judges in making the
constitutionally required determination that
the defendant's plea is truly knowing and
voluntary and will tend to discourage, or at
least facilitate swift disposition of, postconviction attacks on the validity of guilty
pleas because the trial judge will have
produced a clearly adequate record for
review.
Id. at 1314.
The State does not attack the policies behind the
strict compliance rule, but indicates that this Court should reevaluate that rule inasmuch as the State perceives
inconsistencies in applications of that rule.

Appellee's brief

at 12-15.
For purposes of clarification, it is helpful to divide
the cases discussed by the State into three categories: 1) preGibbons cases applying the "record as a whole" test; 2) postGibbons cases applying the strict compliance rule; and 3) postGibbons cases applying the "record as a whole" test.

1
E.g. State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah
Ct.App.); cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988).
2

In the first category of cases, the pre-Gibbons cases
applying the "record as a whole" test, the court behaved in a
manner paralleling the State's argument in this case, evaluating
the voluntariness of plea entries with all available factors
(plea affidavits, representation by counsel, intelligence of the
defendant, prior experience in the criminal justice system,
x2
etc.)
.
In the second category of cases, the post-Gibbons cases
applying the strict compliance rule, are cases such as State v.
Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah Ct.App.); cert, denied, 765 P.2d
1278 (Utah 1988), and State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332 (Utah App.
1989).

These cases, like Gibbons, indicate that relying on a

2
See State v. Jolivet, 784 P.2d 1148, 1149 (Utah August
22, 1989)(Mr. Jolivet's convictions and sentences were affirmed
in 1986 (before Gibbons); court applied "record as a whole
test").
The court's failure to point out the date of Mr.
Jolivet's convictions in light of its decision to apply the
record as a whole test is not an indication that the court was
abandoning Gibbons. See State v. Vasilacopulos, 765 P.2d 1278
(Utah 1988)(denying petition for writ of certiorari); State v.
Hickman, 779 P.2d 670, 672 n.l (Utah August 17, 1989)(per curiam,
with Justice Stewart concurring in the result)(characterizing
Gibbons as a "clear break with the past", and declining to apply
it retroactively).
Apparently, the Hickman court accepted the State's
argument presented in its brief in that case (No. 880362):
Prior to Gibbons, this Court had always
applied the Brooks-Warner record as a whole
test. This Court should adopt the position
taken by the Court of Appeals in State v.
Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah Ct.App.
1988), rehearing denied, 91 Utah Adv. Rep. 17
(1988), cert, denied 98 Utah Adv. Rep. 3
(1988); that Gibbons represents a clear break
with the past in application of a procedural
rule and that it will not be retroactively
applied.
State's Hickman brief at 7, included in Appendix 1 of this brief.
3

defendant's representation by an attorney and on a plea
affidavit are not sufficient to satisfy Rule 11, but that the
trial court must make a thorough personal inquiry of the
3
defendant at the time the plea is entered.
The third category of cases, the post-Gibbons cases
applying the "record as a whole" test# contains opinions such as
this Court's decision in State v. Thurston, 781 P.2d 1296 (Utah
App. 1989).

The reason this opinion does not apply the Rule 11

strict compliance rule, or rely on Gibbons, Vasilacopulos, or
Valencia is that the issue raised by Mr. Thurston was that he had
4
misunderstood the plea bargain; it did not pertain to the trial
5
court's conduct during the plea hearing.
Appellant's issue addressed in Point II of Appellant's
opening and reply briefs, concerning the prosecutor's failure to
honor the plea agreement, is yet another example of an issue
justifying withdrawal of the guilty plea that is unrelated to the
3
See State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1313-1314 (Utah
1987); State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92, 94 (Utah App. 1988);
State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332, 1334-1335 (Utah App. 1989).
4
Mr. Thurston thought when the prosecution agreed to
recommend probation, the agreement was binding on all state
agencies, including Adult Probation and Parole. Ici. at 1298.
5
Rule 11.

Indeed, it appears that the trial court complied with
This Court explained,
The record here establishes that
defendant was fully informed of his rights
and the consequences of his guilty plea. The
judge, pursuant to Rule 11, informed
defendant of his rights to trial and against
self-incrimination, and related to him the
potential consequences of his guilty plea.
Id. at 1302.
4

Rule 11 strict compliance test set forth in Gibbons*

In short,

Thurston neither relates to, nor calls into question Gibbons,
Vasilacopulos or Valencia.
Because the record in this post-Gibbons Rule 11 case
demonstrates that the trial court failed to meet its burden under
Rule 11, Appellant may raise this issue for the first time on
appeal, and is entitled to relief.

See Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332,

1334 (Utah App. 1989)("'Although the issue here was first raised
on appeal by appellant, in certain cases we may consider the
failure to comply with Rule 11(5) and Gibbons as error
sufficiently manifest and fundamental to be first raised on
appeal to this court.

Cf. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 241-

42 , 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1711, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969)("It was error,
plain on the face of the record, for the trial judge to accept
petitioner's guilty plea without an affirmative showing that it
was intelligent and voluntary.")).
II.
THE PROSECUTOR'S EFFECTUAL
VIOLATION OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT
REQUIRES REVERSAL.
In response to Appellant's argument that the
prosecutor, in twice emphasizing Appellant's criminal record,
which was already in the trial court's file, effectually violated
the plea agreement (which bound the prosecutor to refrain from
opposing Appellant's motion for a diminished sentence), the State
argues that there was no violation of the plea agreement, and
that if there were, Appellant should have given the trial court
the opportunity to fashion a remedy.
5

As the cases cited in footnote 9 of Appellant's
opening brief indicate# the fact that a prosecutor is indirect in
violating a plea bargain does not make the violation any more
acceptable.

Even if the violation of the agreement was

accidental, the result of the violation is the invalidation of
the plea agreement.

State v. Garfield, 552 P.2d 129 (Utah 1976).

The record in the instant case demonstrates the
prosecutor's violation of the plea agreement, and clarifies the
State characterization of the prosecutor's two redundant
summaries of Appellant's criminal record as "innocuous
statements", made "in response to questions by the judge", "not
rising to the level of argument or advocacy".

Appellee's brief

at 7 # 23.
The first "question" asked by the trial court to evoke
the "innocuous" summary of Appellant's criminal record was as
follows:
THE COURT: Well, the drug crimes are just
horrendous.
(T. 7 ) . The prosecutor's second summary of Appellant's criminal
record, came in response to the question, "Mr. Ellett, do you
wish to be heard?"

(T. 17).

The State's argument that sentencing decisions should
be well-informed is well taken.

However, inasmuch as Appellant's

criminal record was already in the court's file, the prosecutor's
summaries of Appellant's criminal record did not provide any
evidence necessary for sentencing.

Rather, they constituted a

violation of the plea agreement not to oppose Appellant's motion
6

for diminished sentencing.
The waiver cases and argument presented by the State do
not apply to this issue because when the issue arose, it was
already beyond the trial court's power to remedy.

When the

prosecutor made the improper arguments, he violated the plea
bargain, invalidating it.

E.g. United States v. Grandinetti, 564

F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1977)(M[T]he sentence must ... be vacated if
the agreement was not kept because the defendant offers his plea
not in exchange for the actual sentence or impact on the judge,
but for the prosecutor's statements in court.").
CONCLUSION
This Court should vacate Appellant's conviction and
sentence, and remand this case to the trial court so that
Appellant can withdraw his plea.
Respectfully submitted this 7th day of June, 1990.

JAMES A. V
Attorneyifior Appellant
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circumstances as a whole support Judge Daniels' finding that the
plea was voluntary.

See Warner v. Morrisf 709 P.2d 309 (Utah

1985), and Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310 (Utah 1985).

Judge

Daniels received a full explanation of the plea agreement in open
court (R. 238 at 2-3). He also established that defendant pled
guilty because he was guilty (R. 238 at 7); leading to a logical
inference that defendant was not pleading guilty due to threats
or inducements.

Finally, defendant executed an affidavit in open

court that specifically states that w[n]o promises or threats of
any kind have been made to induce me to plead guilty." (R. 21).
Defendant cites State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah
1987) for the proposition that the trial judge was required to
question defendant on the record about promises or threats.
Gibbons was decided three years after defendant pled guilty.
Prior to Gibbons# this Court had always applied the Brooks-Warner
record as a whole test.

This Court should adopt the position

taken by the Court of Appeals in State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d
92 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)/ rehearing denied, 91 Utah Adv. Rep. 17
(1988), cert, denied 98 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1988); that Gibbons
represents a clear break with the past in application of a
procedural rule and that it will not be retroactively applied.
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